The Accounting Review·Vol. 93, No. 1·November 2018

分析师对经理人指导的影响

作者：Kimball Chapman (Washington University in St. Louis, USA)

Jeremiah R. Green (The Pennsylvania State University, USA)

摘要：分析师要求经理们在三分之一季度电话会议上提供前瞻性的信息；最常见的是，寻求每股收益的指导。在本研究中，我们考察了分析师提问对经理人未来披露选择的长期影响。使用六种常用的指导，我们发现当分析师要求新的指导或询问之前的指导时🦻，经理们更可能在未来季度提供相似的指导。当分析师们没有询问之前的指导意见时，经理们就不太可能在未来提供这种类型的指导。这种效应是长期的，会影响到盈余公告，而且这种效应在那些信息问题最严重的公司中最强。我们的研究结果表明☝🏽，分析师们显著地影响了经理人的信息披露选择🧑‍🏫。

Analysts' Influence on Managers' Guidance

Kimball Chapman (Washington University in St. Louis, USA), Jeremiah R. Green (The Pennsylvania State University, USA)

ABSTRACT

Analysts ask managers for forward-looking information in one-third of quarterly conference calls; most frequently, seeking earnings per share guidance. In this study, we examine the long-term consequences of analysts' questions on future manager disclosure choices. Using six types of commonly provided guidance, we find that when analysts request new guidance or ask about prior guidance, managers are more likely to provide similar guidance in future quarters. When analysts do not ask about prior guidance, managers are less likely to provide that type of guidance in the future. This effect is long-lasting, spills over into earnings announcements, and is strongest for firms with the most severe information problems. Our results provide evidence that analysts shape managers' disclosure choices in meaningful ways.

原文链接：http://www.aaajournals.org/doi/abs/10.2308/accr-51778

翻译👘：阙江静