一、主题：Private Benefits in IPOs: Evidence from State-Owned Firms

二🙆🏻、主讲人：陈兆辉🧛🏻‍♂️，美国弗吉尼亚大学Mclntire商K8凯发副教授。他本科毕业于复旦大学，在宾夕法尼亚大学获得博士学位。研究领域包括公司金融理论、产业组织、投资银行等。近期他的研究话题是融资合同和声誉。他的研究成果在国际学术刊物Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis👨🏿‍🍼、Journal of Corpaorate Finance、Journal of Financial Economics等上发表，并曾参加大量国际学术会议😠。

三🎒、时间🪲：2016年5月31日 （周二），12:30-13:30

四、地点：主教楼913会议室

五⚇、主持人🤷‍♀️👨🏻‍🦲：黄志刚，凯发平台副教授

摘要：The IPO literature suggests that top executives may intentionally underprice their firms’ IPOs to pursue private benefits. But little systematic evidence exists that executives receive private benefits personally. Using a unique dataset of the Chinese state-owned firms that went public during 1990-2006, we find evidence supporting that CEOs of state-owned firms attempt to get promotions by underpricing IPOs and allocating IPO shares to parties important to their careers. Specifically, we find that i) executives’ chance of promotion is positively correlated with the level of IPO underpricing, and ii) those executives who can benefit more from underpricing, such as younger executives, actually underprice more. We do not find similar effects in private firms. We also document a significant cost, in the form of punishments, associated with this agency behavior.